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Criminal Matters and so within the exclusive legislative authority of
the Parliament of Canada under head 27 of s. 91 of the British North
America Aot.
3 4
Taken at face value, this conclusion begs the question if the
existing rules only protect a person charged with crime from being
compelled to testify against himself in proceedings directed against
him. If, however, as has been argued above, proceedings before a
coroner at which the person charged with murder is compelled to
give evidence are not an inquiry but a step in the prosecution of the
accused, those proceedings would clearly be procedure in criminal
matters. It is submitted that this premise must be implied in the
judgment, and that the validity of provincial legislation relating to
procedure in a properly constituted coroner's inquest remains ques-
tionable.
The decision in the present case will be welcomed by all who
believe that the Crown should be required to obtain convictions by
proper means. The use of legal procedure to achieve an end other
than that for which it was conceived is an abuse of that procedure.
The role of the coroner's inquest is to inquire, discover and allege
that a crime has been committed. The prosecution of an accused
should be confined to those courts which are concerned with deter-
mining his guilt or innocence.
J. C. E. WOOD%-
NEGLIGENCE
Co-Operators Insurance Association v. Kearney, [1965] S.C.R. 106.
MOTOR VEHIcLES - LIABILITY TO GRATUITOUS PASSENGER - MASTER
AND SERVANT - COMMON EMPLOYMENT - COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
In the recent Ontario case of the Co-Operators Insurance Associa-
tion v. Kearney,' the Supreme Court of Canada took another look
34 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 478. In deciding that the coroner's inquest is a
criminal court the Canadian courts have relied heavily on English authorities.
(See the leading case of R. v. Hammond (1899), 29 O.R. 211.) As there are
now a number of significant differences between inquests in England and
Canada, the value of English authorities should be questioned. In England,
for example, a person charged by the verdict of a coroner's court could be
tried without being brought before a justice. Should not the test of determin-
ing whether a procedure falls within the legislative jurisdiction of the Federal
or Provincial Parliaments depend upon the nature of that procedure as it
exists in Canada today? It is submitted that the functional approach adopted
by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal would produce the most sensible solu-
tion to this problem.
J. C. E. Wood is a first year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [19631 2 O.R. 1, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (Ont. H.C.); [19641 1 O.R. 101, 41
D.L.R. (2d) 196 (Ont. C.A.) Aff'd; [19651 S.C.R. 106, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
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at the ramifications of s. 105(2) of The Highway Traffic Act 2 and
how it is affected by the concept of vicarious liability. The facts were
as follows. The plaintiff, Kearney, conducted a real estate and in-
surance business and was an agent of the defendant company "in
soliciting insurance and servicing policy-holders". Whenever a claim
was made by any policy-holder to whom the plaintiff had sold a
policy, it was the general practice of the defendant to send its own
adjuster into the area. Part of the plaintiff's duty was to introduce
this adjuster to the policy-holder and to accompany them both while
the loss was being adjusted.
On November 26, 1957 one of the defendant company's adjusters,
Livesey, came to the plaintiff's office and asked him to make arrange-
ments for meeting with one Sewell for the purpose of adjusting a
claim. The plaintiff was busy with some real estate matters at the
time and did not want to be disturbed, but, on Livesey's insistence,
he agreed to go. Having introduced the adjuster to his client and
accompanied them to the garage where the damaged vehicle was
located, Kearney, anxious to return to his office and his real estate
deal, asked Livesey to drive him to his office, which was only a few
blocks away. On the way, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when
the automobile in which they were riding, owing to Livesey's negli-
gence, collided with a train.
At trial, Haines J. found both the Co-Operators Insurance
Association and Livesey liable to the plaintiff for a total of $16,800.
The Court of Appeal exonerated Livesey but maintained the liability
of the insurance company. In the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr.
Justice Spence delivered a strong majority opinion and Cartwright
and Ritchie JJ. gave two equally adamant dissenting judgments.
As the issues involved are, to a degree, separable, they will be treated
under broad headings and their progress will be traced from the trial
court through the Supreme Court, with various comments made
along the way.
I. The Highway Traffic Act, s. 105 (2)2
Haines J. said that the courts have construed s. 105 (2) so as to
limit the special liability imposed on the owner and driver of the
motor vehicle by s. 105 (1)3 to that as owner and as driver. It is not a
bar to a right of action due to some other relationship. The dis-
2 R.S.O 1960, c. 172, s. 105(2). "Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner
or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business
of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to or the death of any person being carried In,
or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle."
3 "The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for loss or damage sustained
by any person by reason of negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle
on a highway unless the motor vehicle was without the owner's consent In
the possession of some person other than the owner or his chauffeur, and the




appointing feature about this judgment is that Haines J. finds the
defendant Livesey liable without giving any concrete reasons for
this liability. Although he does say that the plaintiff's right of action
arises independently of The Highway Traffic Act and therefore
cannot be taken away by it, he nowhere shows why it arises in-
dependently of the Act as far as Livesey is concerned.
In the Court of Appeal, Aylesworth J.A. makes virtually no
comment on this omission, but just seems to take it as an established
fact that the driver was not liable by virtue of s. 105 (2). This is a
little mystifying, since it is normal for a judge in granting an appeal
to explain in detail his reasons. The only conceivable explanation is
that, since Haines J. did not give any reasons for his course of action,
Aylesworth J.A. could not rebut them.
The Court of Appeal held that the effect of s. 105(2) "is not
to condone a wrongful act by the driver of the motor vehicle qua
driver but simply to bar the cause of action with respect to that act.
The Legislature . . . [barred] a certain cause of action against a
wrongdoer without in any way affecting the legal result of the wrong-
ful act with respect to someone else liable for that wrongful act upon
some principle of the common law."' 4 Thus the contention of the
insurance company, that because s. 105(2) exonerated Livesey they
too should be freed from liability, was to no avail.5
The case which attracted most attention on the part of the
various judges who tried this matter was Harrison v. Toronto Motor
Car Ltd. & Krug.6 Mr. Justice Judson based his whole decision on this
case and said that if this case were overruled, then his decision would
have to be altered. Mr. Justice Cartwright severely attacked the
Harrison precedent and if his voice had prevailed, the result in the
instant case would have been reversed.
In Harrison,7 the plaintiff was a registered nurse, who was at all
relevant times in the employ of the deceased, Albert E. Krug. Owing
to his physical and nervous condition, Krug needed medical and
nursing attention and the plaintiff therefore accompanied him on a
long motor trip to the Maritimes and back. Krug had his own car
but had arranged with the Toronto Motor Car Ltd. to supply him with
chauffeur's services. The motor company sent one McKenzie, who
drove Krug's car. Unfortunately, near the end of the trip, McKenzie
got on the wrong side of the road and hit another car head on, killing
Krug and seriously injuring Miss Harrison. She then brought an
action against Krug's estate and the motor company, claiming
damages for her injuries.
4 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 198 (D.L.R.).
5 This finding by the Court of Appeal follows a line of cases to the same
effect. See, for example, Smith v. Moss et al., [1940J 1 K.B. 424 and Broom
v. Morgan, [19531 1 Q.B. 597.
6 [19451 O.R. 1, [19451 1 D.L.R. 286.
7 Ibid.
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Section 47(2) (predecessor of 105(2)) of The Highway Traffic
Act8 was unsuccessfully relied upon by the plaintiff in an attempt to
prove that, when involved in the accident, the vehicle was being
operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation. If
this line of argument did not work in the Harrison case,9 it certainly
would be doomed to failure in the case under analysis.
In interpreting s-s. 2, Gillanders J.A. said that the literal wording
of the sub-section should not be taken at face value but the intention
of the Legislature should be sought out. He arrived at the same con-
clusion as Haines J. namely, that the provisions of s-s. 2, directed as
they are to the liability of the owner and the driver, should be
restricted to their liability qua owner and qua driver and should not
necessarily bar a right of action arising out of some other relation-
ship. As a result, if the plaintiff has a cause of action against his
employer by reason of the negligence of its servant, s-s. 2 does not
take it away even though at the time it arose, the employee was
being carried in his employer's vehicle. If this reasoning and the con-
clusions based upon it are valid, they apply verbatim to the Kearney
case.10
Mr. Justice Cartwright thought he had found the "intention"
of the Legislature in s. 2(2) of The Negligence Act.1 His Lordship
maintained that this subsection indicates the Legislature intended
that driver and owner should be grouped together for the purpose
of determining liability. Therefore, when the driver is excused from
liability the owner should be as well.
In Mr. Justice Cartwright's words:
In my view the effect of s. 105(2) is not merely to afford a personal or
procedural defence to the driver but to take away the passenger's right
of action founded upon the driver's negligence. I am unable to impute
to the Legislature the intention to free from liability the one person
8 R.S.O. 1939, c. 165.
9 Supra, footnote 6.
10 On the other hand, J. D. Morton, in a searching article in (1958), 36
Can. Bar Rev. 414, at pp. 416-417 contends that the finding of liability does
not depend on the relationship of master and servant existing between the
parties (here Kearney and the Co-operators Insurance Association) but rather
on the relationship of master and servant which exists between the driver
(i.e. Livesey) and the employer Co-operators Insurance Association. Thus,
the relationship existing between Kearney and the C.I.A. was immaterial
to the finding that s. 105(2) did not save the defendant; the defendant, being
liable vicariously for the negligence of its servant, Livesey, it mattered not
whether Kearney was a stranger or in some legal relationship to him.
11 R.S.O. 1960, c. 261, s. 2(2). "In any action brought for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being
carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from a motor
vehicle other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers
for compensation, and the owner or driver of the motor vehicle that the
injured or deceased person was being carried in, or upon or entering, or
getting on to, or alighting from is one of the persons found to be at fault or
negligent, no damages are, and no contribution or indemnity is, recoverable
for the portion of the loss or damage caused by the fault or negligence of such
owner or driver, and the portion of the loss or damage so caused by the
fault or negligence of such owner or driver shall be determined although such
owner or driver is not a party to the action."
[VOL. 4
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whose negligence was fons et origo mali and at the same time to impose
liability upon those, morally innocent of any wrongdoing, who would
have been required to answer vicariously for the driver's negligence
had he remained liable.12
Throughout his judgment, Cartwright J. expresses an obvious
dissatisfaction with s. 105(2), but says that "if the words of the
subsection are plain and unequivocal the Courts must give effect
to them although they bring about what, in the eyes of the common
law, appears to be a grave injustice."'13
To rebut Cartwright J.'s contention that the Harrison case had
misinterpreted what is now s. 105(2), Mr. Justice Spence, in the
majority opinion, stated that the Harrison case was well known to
every lawyer and Judge in Ontario and yet The Highway Traffic Act
had been revised twice in the nineteen years between the cases and
not a word had been changed in the subsection under consideration.
Also, the Harrison decision had been applied in several subsequent
Ontario cases.
14
The supposed raison d'etre of s. 105 (2) is to reduce the incidence
of fraud by the family and friends of people injured in automobile
collisions. Apparently, insured people would admit negligence on their
parts where none in fact existed in order to help their friends collect
from the insurance companies. It does seem strange that this problem
is confined to Ontario. Surely a more efficacious scheme could be
devised which does not arbitrarily deprive over 41% of the persons
injured in motor vehicle mishaps15 of any hope of recovery.
16
II. Common EmpZoyment
At common law the defence of common employment had been
recognized since the leading case of Priestly v. Fowler.'7 The pro-
visions of The Workmen's Compensation Act 8 have restricted its
application greatly in recent years. In the Harrison decision, it was
held that to establish the defence of common employment it must
be shown not only that the employees concerned are in the service
of a common master, but are engaged in what may be termed, broadly
speaking, a common undertaking.
Thus, in the Harrison case, a professional nurse, engaged to care
for a patient, is not in common employment with such patient's
chauffeur whose negligence caused her to become seriously injured.
12 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 6 (D.L.R.).
13 Ibid., at p. 4.
14 Barclay v. Taylor, [1946] O.W.N. 737 (H.C.); Wiksech 'v. General
News Co., [1948] O.R. 105 (Ont. C.A.); Lemieux v. Bedard, [1952] O.R. 500
(H.C.); Aldridge v. Van Patter, [1952] O.R. 595 (H.C.); Duchaine v. Armstrong
and Legault, [1957] O.W.N. 251 (Ont. C.A.); Chenier v. Morin, [1958] O.R.
610 (H.C.).
15 The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims
of Automobile Accidents (1965), ch. 4, p. 7.
16 For a lucid discussion of the various techniques used by the Courts
to side-step s. 105(2) see, A. M. Linden, Note (1962), 40 Can. Bar Rev. 284.
17 (1837), 3 M. & W. 1, 150 E.R. 1030.
18 R.S.O. 1960, c. 437.
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On the surface, the fact situation in the Kearney judgment seems to
fill the prerequisites of common employment as laid down in the
Harrison case. However, at trial, Haines J. held that the defence of
common employment was not available to the defendants by reason
of the provisions of Part 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
s. 125 (1) .19 This viewpoint was confirmed by Spence J. in the Supreme
Court of Canada. This did not mean that the employer had to guaran-
tee the absolute safety of his servants but simply that he must take
reasonable care. The Court decided that the negligence of Livesey
constituted a breach of that duty and a breach for which the insur-
ance company, as employers of Livesey, was responsible in law.
III. Course of Employment
One of the claims of the defendants and the one on which Mr.
Justice Ritchie based almost his entire judgment, was that Kearney
was under no obligation to ride back to his office with Livesey. He
could easily have walked the three or four blocks after the business
transaction with the client was completed. Thus, this line of reason-
ing goes, he was not injured in the course of his employment and
therefore did not have a right of recovery under s. 124 of The Work-
men's Compensation Act20 for damages which occurred "by reason
of the negligence of . . .any person in the service of his employer
[i.e. Livesey] acting within the scope of his employment."
In his dissenting judgment Mr. Justice Ritchie applies St. Helens
Colliery Co. v. Hewitson2' to show that Kearney was not in the course
of employment when injured. In this case Lord Wrenbury said:
The man is not in the course of his employment unless the facts are such
that it is in the course of his employment, and in performance of a duty
under his contract of service that he is found in the place where the
accident occurs. If there is only a right and there is no obligation binding
on the man in the matter of his employment, there is no liability.22
The St. He7ens Colliery case was followed in Canada by Dallas
v. Hinton 4, Home Oil Distributors Ltd.23 and Hoar v. Wallace.24 In
the Dallas case a saleman used his own car for company business,
but the company paid the costs of operation whether it was used for
company or private purposes. He had attended a meeting at the
company's request and was on his way home when he negligently
struck and injured the plaintiff. The Court held that, after the meet-
ing, his day's work was done; he was free to do as he pleased and
free to go home without any further control or direction from his
19 "A workman shall be deemed not to have undertaken the risks due to
the negligence of his fellow workmen and contributory negligence on the
part of the workman is not a bar to recovery by him or by any person
entitled to damages under The Fatal Accidents Act in an action for the
recovery of damages for an injury sustained by or causing the death of the
workman while in the service of his employer for which the employer would
otherwise have been liable."
20 Supra, footnote 18.
21 [1924) A.C. 59.
22 Ibid., at p. 95. Italics mine.
23 [1938] 2 D.L.R. 673 (S.C.C.).
24 [1938] 4 D.L.R. 774 (Ont. C.A.).
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master as to the route, mode of transportation or otherwise. His only
obligation was to be at work on time the next morning. Thus he was
under no control by his employer and, therefore, the latter was not
liable for his negligence.
The Ontario Court of Appeal said that Kearney was not a free
agent as the individuals had been in these other cases: "He had been
transported to the place where the work of adjustment occurred in
the car of the defendant Livesey and for the very purpose of engag-
ing in that endeavour."25 Thus Aylesworth J.A. held that "he was
entitled, as part of their joint work as employees of the other
defendant [i.e. Co-Operators Insurance Association], to be returned
in the same vehicle to the place whence he came; his employment in
that endeavour . . . continued until that had been done."26 In the
Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Spence concurred with this
holding. In the other two Canadian cases, the employee, having com-
pleted the errand of his employer, was in charge of his own transporta-
tion and free to go whither he desired.
However, Mr. Justice Ritchie shows that the fact patterns in
these three cases are very similar and that, to be consistent, the
Supreme Court would have to find that Kearney had to go back to
his office with Livesey. The evidence does not show this to be true
and it is obvious that if the plaintiff had wanted to return to his
office by some other mode of transportation or if he had desired to
stop and shop, he could have done so. Livesey was just giving him
a ride to be friendly and, also, it was the natural thing to do. Thus,
there was no obligation binding on Kearney to return with Livesey
and thus, according to the Dallas and Hoar precedents, the defendants
were not liable.
Unfortunately, it is only Mr. Justice Ritchie who stressed this
point as Cartwright J. placidly accepted the opinion of the Court of
Appeal. Mr. Justice Cartwright observed that there appears to be
great force to the argument that Kearney was not in the course of
employment when the accident occurred, by virtue of the fact that
he was free to go back to his office in whatever fashion he desired.
Then he stated that since Aylesworth J.A. had dealt with this matter
on appeal and had decided in a certain way, he would "assume, with-
out deciding, that the . . . view taken by the Courts below is cor-
rect. '27 It is to be regretted that the learned Justice failed to take
a stand as we are therefore deprived of a definitive precedent on this
very important point.
Conclusion
Co-Operators Insurance Association v. Kearney28 leaves as many
questions unanswered as it resolves. Mr. Justice Judson's opinion is
25 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 197 (D.L.R.).
26 Ibid.
27 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 3 (D.L.R.).
28 Supra, footnote 1.
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
very superficial and stands or falls on the Harrison precedent. The
dissenting judgments are, in some places, logically sound but, in
others, display an unhealthy placid acceptance of lower court's rea-
soning. The one recurring theme throughout all the judgments is
the universal dissatisfaction with s. 105(2) of The Highway Traffic
Act.29 If this man-made barrier to the logical application of equitable
principles had not been present, a large segment of the artificiality
in the reasoning of the Courts would have been eradicated. This sub-
section has resulted in untold injustice and needless suffering and it
is to be hoped that the Ontario Legislature will shortly awaken to its
responsibilities and repeal this odious subsection which has been
called one of the "most vicious pieces of legislation which an active
insurance lobby was able to foist on an unsuspecting public."
30
THOMAS J. LOCKWOOD*
Sterling Trusts Corporation et al. v. Postma and Little, [1965] S.C.R.
324.
MOTOR VEHICLES - NEGLIGENCE - TRUCK INVOLVED IN COLLISION
BETWEEN TWO AUTOMOBILES - OWNER AND DRIVER OF TRUCK FOUND
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DRIVER OF ONE OF THE AUTO-
MOBILES - DRIVER OF AUTOMOBILE ALONE HELD LIABLE ON APPEAL -
NEW TRIAL ORDERED BY SUPREME COURT ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS.
In the case of Sterling Trusts Corporation et al. v. Postma and
Little,' the Supreme Court of Canada had to determine the effect of
breach by the driver of a motor vehicle of a statutory provision (i.e.
The Highway Traffic Act2) designed for the protection of other users
of the highway (viz. failing to have illuminated a tail light at night).
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on the evening
of December 19, 1959, after dark at a point about two miles west of
Trenton, Ontario on highway No. 2. The night was clear and the
paved highway was dry and straight so that from the crest of a knoll
more than 420 feet to the east of the estimated point of collision
there was clear visibility. Henry Postma was proceeding west in his
1953 Meteor at a speed of "at least 50 to 55 miles per hour" when,
29 Supra, footnote 2.
30 C. A. Wright (1945), 23 Can. Bar Rev. 344, at p. 347.
* Thomas J. Lockwood, B.A. (McGill), is a second year student at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 [1965] S.C.R. 324, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 423.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172. S. 33(1) '"WVhen on a highway at any time from
one-half hour after sunset to one half-hour before sunrise every motor vehicle
shall carry three lighted lamps in a conspicuous position, one on each side of
the front which shall cast a white, green or amber coloured light only, and
one on the back of the vehicle which shall cast from its face a red light only,
• and any lamp so used shall be clearly visible at a distance of at least
5feet from the front or rear as the case may be."
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